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Procurement awarding mechanisms based on average price have
been advocated to soften price competition and reduce cost overruns.
We show that their theoretical support is shaky. When the bid closest
to the average is awarded, firms submit identical bids, making the
selection extremely costly and random, without reducing opportunistic
behaviors ex-post. When instead the bid closest and below the average
is awarded, the equilibrium is very sensitive to firms’ production and
participation costs. Either it displays tougher competition than in a
first price auction, or it induces firms to randomize their bids. [JEL
Classification: D44, H57]
1. - Introduction
Bid Average Methods (BAMs) award procurement contracts
based on the average price submitted by competing suppliers at the
tendering stage. In recent years, different countries have applied
these mechanisms, mainly in construction industry, as an alternative
to low-bid methods (where the awarding rule assigns a contract to
the low-bid firm). The main reason why BAMs are becoming popular
seems that, according to their advocates, they soften price
competition, thereby reducing the likelihood of cost overrun and
consequent costly renegotiation at the contract execution stage.
In this article, we provide a critical assessment of these methods.
In Section 2, we describe a number of different forms BAMs have
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taken in practice. Broadly speaking, these can be viewed as (variants
of) two main awarding rules: in the first, the bid closest to the
average wins; in the second, the winning bid is the one closest and
below the average. In Section 3, we compare BAMs with other more
established methods, namely beauty contests and negotiations,
which may prove more suitable if one needs to soften or suppress
all together price competition. In fact, a higher awarding price may
help — though at a very high cost — when cost overruns are only
due to suppliers’ inaccurate estimates of the cost of serving the
contract or to the emergence of unforeseen contingencies. However,
it need not reduce the incentives for an opportunistic contractor to
claim cost overruns, and require a higher compensation, once the
contract has been signed. 
In Section 4, we analyze in detail the distortions in bidding
behavior the various forms of BAMs observed in reality tend to
produce. When the bid closest to the average is awarded, firms have
incentive to coordinate on a collusive equilibrium: they submit
identical bids, making the selection extremely costly and random.
When instead the bid closest and below the average is awarded, firms’
incentive to coordinate falls. Still, the auction may display collusive
behaviors since existing cartels are easier to sustain than under a
standard low-bid rule. Moreover, the resulting equilibrium is very
sensitive to firms’ production costs. If one firm has a large comparative
advantage in terms of efficiency, it will be selected, but price
competition will be harsher, not softer, than with a low-bid method.
Otherwise, the equilibrium will involve randomization. This may make
the outcome very hard to predict by the procurement agency.
In Section 5, we analyze the suppliers’ decision to submit a
bid in case participation is costly. First, we show that BAMs
generally increase participation, by giving some chance of
winning also to less efficient firms, but equilibrium prices
increase with the number of firms submitting an offer. Second,
we show that when the bid closest and below the average is
awarded, the outcome becomes equivalent to a simpler and more
standard low-bid competitive tendering. Section 6 concludes
stressing that the popularity of BAMs remains mainly a puzzle
for the procurement scholar.
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2. - Bid Average Methods in Procurement: Examples and 
Justifications
2.1 Examples
A: Florida Department of Transportation (U.S.A.)
Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) has adopted the
bid average method. This method is considered the best solution
when there is ample competition. Concretely, two main scenarios
are distinguished. When three or four bidders participate, the bid
closest to the average is selected. When five or more contractors
bid, the low bid and the high bid are excluded, and the bid closest
to the average of the remaining bids is selected. If there are
irregularities in the bid, the bid is thrown out, and the next closest
to the average is selected.
The method is advocated for (i) getting the contractor to bid
a true and reasonable cost for a project, and (ii) minimizing claims
and cost overruns. Until 2001, only four FDOT projects (mainly
mowing contracts) had used this technique. According to FDOT
the intent of having contractors bid a more realistic cost, thereby
minimizing cost overruns, has borne results, as these contracts
have only overrun by 4%. FDOT expressed the view that BAM
bidding is preferable when a “low bid” is anticipated to be a
significant problem. This situation is likely to arise when
inexperienced or unsophisticated constructors bid on small
maintenance projects.
B: State of New York (U.S.A.)
The Procurement Services Group of the State of New York
Executive Department1 has formulated an even more convoluted
awarding criterion for buying asphalt. The method of award
requires a five-step procedure:
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1 Tendering procedure issued on 10th November 2004 for commodity group
31501 - Liquid Bituminous Materials.
1. An “average price” is calculated based on the price of all
bids submitted.
2. Any bid that exceeds the “average price” by more than 50%
will be made Awarding Pending.
3. A “revised average price” is calculated after removal of those
over 50%.
4. Any remaining bids that do not exceed the “revised average
price” increased by 10% will receive a contract award.
5. Any contractor given an “Award Pending” may become
eligible for award by reducing their price(s) within the parameters
of point 4.
C: Italy
The Italian National Agency for Information Technology in the
Public Administration (CNIPA) pursues a variety of institutional
goals. Among other things, it sets the guidelines for designing,
implementing and managing acquisitions of IT solutions for the
Italian Public Administration. Among the set of awarding rules
suggested in CNIPA (2006)’s guidelines there is one special variant
of the bid average method. More specifically, suppose that the
tendering process allocates at most N (0 < N < 100) points to an
economic offer and (100 – N) to a technical offer. Consider firm i
submitting an offer equal to pi. Firm i’s economic score is
determined as follows: If pi < a * K, then firm i gets all economic
points (N); otherwise it gets 
N * [pmax – pi] / [pmax – a * K],
where pmax is the highest among all tenders, a is the average tender,
and K is a “correction coefficient” between 0 and 1 (generally
around .8 and .9).
Two features of the awarding rule are worth noticing. First,
if tenders are not too concentrated and K is high enough, say .9,
the CNIPA’s variant of the bid award method allocates all economic
points to the lowest submitted tender and to all others below the
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“corrected” average. Thus, it is possible that different firms
submitting different offers are awarded the same number of
economic points. Second, firms submitting tenders above the
“corrected average” get a number of points, which decrease with
the distance from the “corrected average.”2
A second variant used in Italy, reported by Ioannou and Leu
(1993), awards the contract to the firm submitting the tender
closer to the average among those below the average.
D: Peru
Article 4.3.13 of the Peruvian regulations for bidding and
contracting for public works states (translation by Henriod and
Lantran (2000)):
“An award will be made in accordance with the following
procedure:
1) When three or more bids have been received:
a) The average of all bids and the base budget will be
calculated.
b) All bids that lie 10 percent above and below this average
will be eliminated.
c) The average of the remaining bids and the base budget will
then be calculated.
d) The contract will be awarded to the bidder whose bid is
immediately below the second average (or, should none of the bids
lie below the second average, the award will be made to the bid
which more closely approximates the average.)3
2) If less than three bids are received, the bidding agency may
cancel the process, and award the contract to the lowest bidder
or to the only bidder if this were the case.
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2 The variant suggested by CNIPA (2006) is equivalent to a linear scoring rule
with an endogenously determined threshold. For more on scoring rules see Chapter
12 in DIMITRI N. - PIGA G. - SPAGNOLO G. (eds.) (2006).
3 We put this in parenthesis because there must have been a mistake in the
translation, unless a very novel concept of average has been developed such that
the average may be smaller than all its components.
2.2 Research Discussing their Properties
While it sounds intuitive that BAMs may soften price
competition, little effort has been devoted so far to explore how
firms respond to a rule rewarding the bidder with the most
accurate guess of the average bid. To the best of our knowledge,
a formal model of the bid average method has been studied only
by Ioannou and Leu (1993). The authors consider a model in
which N firms submit sealed bids for a contract. Production costs
are assumed to be private information, and each firm’s bidding
function is equal to its cost plus a mark-up. In “standard” auction
theory, it is customary to make certain assumptions on the
distribution of private costs. In the Independent Private Value
model4, for instance, private costs are modeled as independent
and identically distributed random variables. If a symmetric
equilibrium is to be characterized, it is normally assumed that
bidders 2 to N follow a strictly monotonic (and differentiable)
bidding function. Then one looks at the necessary conditions that
the bidding function must satisfy in order it to be bidder 1’s best
response. Ioannou and Leu (1993) adopt quite a different
approach. They consider firms’ bid-to-cost ratios as the relevant
random variables and compute the probability that a specific firm
bid is the closest to the average. However, this is done by making
no assumptions on the shape of other firms’ bidding functions.
The authors instead perform a Montecarlo simulation and show
that firms’ expected payoffs are always higher under the bid
average method than under the low-bid method.
Bid average methods are also mentioned by Liu et al. (2000)
and discussed by Henriod and Lantran (2000) and Engel and
Wambach (2004). These last authors argue that the same
specification of the bid average method studied by Ioannou ad
Leu (1993) pushes all firms to choose the highest possible price
even when production costs are private information. Thus, firms
coordinate on a focal point, which leads to a random allocation
of the contract. To be sure, Ioannou and Leu (1993) also recognize
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4 See KLEMPERER P. (2004).
that the bid average method has a collusive drawback. However,
their argument differs from the one made by Engel and Wambach
(2004), which is further developed in the current paper. Ioannou
and Leu (1993) point out that some firms may have an incentive
to create dummy bidders that submit identical offers to their
affiliated firms. Thus dummy companies and the affiliated firms
pull the average towards their own price. If the dummy variable
wins the contract, it simply passes the entire project to the
affiliated contractor.
3. - Why Average Price Auctions? Alternative Allocations
Mechanisms
The brief survey conducted in the previous section highlights
that the practice of BAMs aims mainly at softening price
competition in procurement tendering processes. However, it may
appear contradictory to use a competitive awarding procedure that
hinges on price, coupled with an awarding rule that is meant to
limit price competition. If the latter turns out to be the procurer’s
main concern, one could argue for other allocation mechanisms
that, in most cases, do not involve any price competition at all.
In what follows, we consider two alternative and established
allocation mechanisms that more directly reduce price
competition: beauty contest and negotiations.
3.1 Beauty Contests
A “beauty contest” (or comparative tender) is an
allocation/selection mechanism that specifies a number of criteria
according to which firms’ projects are evaluated. The contractor
is the firm whose project shows the best “mix” of dimensions. At
a first sight, a beauty contest is not very different from a
procurement tendering process with multiple criteria whereby
firms’ offers contain both a technical and an economic component
that are evaluated according to a scoring rule. However, there are
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two fundamental differences between a beauty contest and a
competitive tendering procedure. In the former: i) the rule
according to which different offers are evaluated is stated in much
more generic terms, leaving more discretion to the buyer in
evaluating qualitative aspects that are hard to codify in a
formalized way, and in refusing suspicious or unrealistic bids; and
ii) “prices” are not a crucial aspect, while they are paramount in
the latter. 
3.2 Negotiations
An even more effective alternative, often adopted in private
procurement when the good or service procured is not
standardized but customized to the buyer specific needs, is that
of selecting one (or very few) reputable supplier(s), known to be
able to meet the demand, and to negotiate sale conditions only
with him (them). In this way, competition is under direct, full
control. Negotiations are also used in public procurement,
particularly for complex products or services that are hard to
specify contractually, and where quality has complete priority over
price concerns.5
3.3 Comment
As average price auctions, these alternative allocation
mechanisms soften or suppress price competition, hence leaving
a larger margin to the supplier. This reduces (though does not
eliminate) the likelihood of cost overrun and renegotiation, to the
extent that these are linked either to suppliers’ mistakes in the ex-
ante estimation of their cost, or to unforeseen contingencies
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5 For example, NASA, and its Italian counterpart ASI, have extremely detailed
and effective methodologies to guide first the preliminary supplier selection
process, based on direct inspection of potential suppliers production methods and
capabilities; and then structured bilateral negotiations on the characteristics of the
required good or service and on its price.
occurring after the project has started.6 In addition, these are
generally better than average price auctions, which, as described
in the next section, may induce very problematic bidding
behaviors. 
While a procurement agency may try to insure against post-
contractual problems by limiting price competition, it is
important to consider the serious drawbacks induced by this
strategy. First, and most obviously, all these methods may be
extremely costly in terms prices to be paid to the winning firm.
For example, as seen in the next section, in the standard average
price auction the agency might end up paying its reservation
price. Second, there exist alternative methods to directly
purchase insurance that are generally more effective and less
costly. For example, the agency can pay a specialized surety
company to bear the risk of a non-performing winning firm. This
is done by issuing a bond, specifying the amount to be paid to
the agency in case the contractor defaults and the surety
company does not resume the contract (see Ch. 13 in Dimitri,
Piga and Spagnolo (eds., 2006). Third, it is not even clear that,
higher prices help reducing cost overruns and hold-up problems.
Indeed, standard economic theory identifies moral hazard as a
major source of these issues, and in this respect the awarding
prize, being sunk, is simply irrelevant. In other words, absent
reputation or fairness concerns, high awarding price does not
reduce a firm ability to behave opportunistically once the
contract has been signed.
Hence, the last problem is contractual, and not linked to the
awarding method. It should then be resolved by choosing the
appropriate contracting strategy. In particular, if lock-in and
unforeseen contingencies are important, then fix-price contracts
are generally not advisable. In construction industry, for instance,
the most common sources of changes in building construction
are defective plans and specifications, and differing conditions
than expected at the construction site. Thus, the initial contract
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6 In the construction of a new tunnel, for instance, excavation may be delayed,
and even stopped, by the discovery of a particularly resistant rock that needs
specific drilling machine.
suffers from some form of incompleteness which often leads to
contentious adversarial negotiations. These are likely to arise
whenever the initial contract is awarded by using a fixed-price
competitive tendering, while if the contract has a cost-plus (or
cost-reimbursement) nature, changes to the original specifications
can be almost automatically included. In fact, by adopting a cost-
plus contract (CPC) the buyer agrees to reimburse all (documented)
production costs related to the project. Moreover, as argued in
Bajari and Tadelis (2006), the buyer should not use a competitive
tendering procedure to award such a contract, since this procedure
may fail to choose the most efficient supplier. Whenever possible,
the agency should instead search among the most reputable firms
and choose one to negotiate with and agree on the terms of the
CPC.
4. - The Drawbacks of Bid Average Methods
4.1 Pro-Collusive Aspects of the Florida Type
Three firms compete for procuring a service. Each firm i = 1,
2, 3 bears a cost ci for procuring the service. For illustration,
assume that competitors know each other’s efficiency levels, since
for example they have been interacting in the market for quite a
while.7 However, the procurement agency cannot distinguish low-
cost from high-cost suppliers. Without loss of generality, we
assume that 
c3 > c2 > c1,
that is, firm 1 is the most efficient firm whereas firm 3 is the least
efficient. The procurement agency publicly announces a reserve
price r > c3 which represents the highest price at which it is willing
to buy the service. Firms submit sealed-bid offers (p1, p2, p3). The
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7 Moreover, each of them knows that all others know his efficiency and so on.
Formally, we are assuming that production costs are “common knowledge” among
the competing firms.
winner is the firm whose bid is closest to the average of all
admissible bids. Thus firm i’s payoff writes 
where a is the average of all tenders, that is, (p1 + p2 + p3)/3.
Moreover, we also assume that ties are broken by using a random
device that assigns equal probability to each winning offer.
Notice that ties can only arise when all firms submit the same
price.
The bid average method provide firms with an incentive to
submit exactly the same tenders. This can be easily seen by using
the following line of reasoning. Suppose that firm 1 were to believe
that firms 2 and 3 are willing to submit c3 < p2 = p3 = p < r. Does
firm 1 have an incentive to submit any p1 different than p? Notice
first that if p1 = p, the average a = p and firm 1’s payoff is (p – c1)/3
> 0. Suppose, instead, that firm 1 deviates by submitting p1 < p.
8
The new average is a1 = (1/3) p1 + (2/3) p. Clearly, the value p has
a higher weight in the average than p1. Thus, p is closer to the new
average than p1, which implies that firm 1 gets a payoff equal to
zero.
To sum up, if any of the three firms believes that the other
two competitors are willing to submit the same tender (higher
than the reserve price), the remaining firm finds it profitable to
submit exactly the same tender as well.9 The resulting outcome is
that the three firms will end up submitting the same tenders and
the winner will selected by a random device. Our analysis suggests
two main conclusions:
— The first variant of Bid-Average Method provides a clear
incentive to firms to find a “focal point”. This is arguably collusive,
since the higher the focal point the higher firms’ profit.
 
Π i i i i i jp a
p c p a p a j i
,
 , ,( ) = − − < − ∀ ≠⎧⎨⎪
⎩⎪
if
0, otherwise
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8 This is without loss of generality. The same line of reasoning would hold
with p1 > p.
9 More formally, any profile of tenders p1 = p2 = p3 = p < r constitutes a Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the Bid-Average tendering game.
— The allocation of the contract may be inefficient since the
probability that the low-cost firm is awarded the contract is 1/3.
It can also be proven that firms do not have an incentive to
submit different tenders provided that they are all lower than the
reserve price, but higher than the highest production cost (c3).
4.2 Additional Pro-Collusive Aspects of the NYS Type (Coalition
Proofness)
When firms manage to coordinate on the same bid, the variant
used by the State of New York described in Section 2.1 induces
the same outcome as the one generated by the BAM in Florida.
To see this, suppose that the three competing firms submit the
same p ≤ r. Since the average will be exactly p, no firm will be
ever given an Award Pending. Thus, there is no need to compute
a “corrected average.” Being all identical, bids will not exceed the
average by 10%, so all firms will receive a contract award.10
A closer look reveals two subtler aspects of the variant used
by the State of New York. First, it makes coordination feasible
even when some firms accidentally do not submit the “right” bid.
To see this, consider a very simple numerical example. Suppose
that 10 firms try to coordinate on a price for the contract of
USD 90k. Upon submitting their offers, one firm, say firm 1,
“accidentally” bids USD 150k. The resulting average is then 96k,
and firm 1 is given an Award Pending. The corrected average is
90k and firms 2 to 10 are given a contract award. However, firm
1 can still correct its mistake and submit the “right” bid (90k) thus
obtaining a contract award as well.
The second aspect of the variant used by the State of New
York concerns a pro-collusive mechanism, which is built in the
awarding rule. Suppose that all potential competitors, say 10
firms, form a cartel and coordinate to submit the highest possible
price, that is, the reserve price. Under the variant used by FDOT
it is possible that some of the firms in the cartel, say five out of
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10 That is, if the State of NY is buying USD 10M of asphalt, each contractor
gets 1/3 of the contract. This is equivalent ex ante to getting the whole contract
with probability 1/3 according to the variant used by FDOT.
ten firms, agree to make a joint deviation by submitting a lower
price. Such a deviation would consist in submitting an offer that
makes the five defecting firms the sole winners. Thus, the variant
of FDOT may induce coordination; it cannot prevent “joint
deviations” or deviations made by sub-coalitions. Under the
variant used by the State of New York, instead, if the joint
deviation is such that the non-deviating firms are left above 50%
of the average, they are still given an Award Pending and have
still a chance of modifying their bids to react to deviating firms’
offer. Thus, deviations by sub-coalitions are less profitable than
under the FDOT variant.
4.3 Instability and Collusion in the BAMs Used in Italy
The two variants of the BAM used in Italy destroy firms’
incentive to coordinate on the same price. In the variant suggested
by CNIPA, this is immediately seen since all firms get a number
of economic points equal to zero if they submit exactly the same
price. In the second variant, whereby the winning firm is the one
submitting the tender closest to the average among those below
the average, we can also show that it is not in the firms’ interest
to submit the same offer.
To see this last point, assume first that when firms submit
the same offers — so no bid is below the average — each firm is
awarded the contract with equal probability. Consider the same
three-firm environment studied in Section 4.1. Suppose again that
firms 2 and 3 submit the same tender p > r. If p1 = p then firm
1’s payoff is (p – c1)/3. However, firm 1 can raise its payoff by
submitting an offer just below p, say p1'. The resulting new average
would lie in the interval (p1', p), and firm 1’s offer would be the
unique offer below the average. If p1' is lower than, but sufficiently
close to p (say p – 1cent), firm 1’s deviation yields a payoff (p1'–
c1) > (p – c1)/3.
While not providing an incentive to coordinate on a focal
point, this variant still makes deviations from an existing collusive
agreement more costly than, say, the low-bid awarding method.
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Consider a procurement contract for supplying a number of
identical laptops, with a reserve price of €1,000 each. Suppose,
for the sake of simplicity, that competition takes place on the price
of the laptop only, so there are no technical points related to the
various quality dimensions. N > 2 firms participate in the
competitive procurement and adopt a simple collusive mechanism:
firm “1” wins the contract by submitting an offer of €999/laptop
while all other (N–1) firms bid the reserve price.11 Surplus is then
shared. If the low-bid awarding rule is adopted, non-winning
bidders can break the cartel by just offering €998. The cost of
breaking the cartel is the same for all: by reducing the price by
€1/laptop, any bidder is effectively able to break the agreement
and win the contract.
Consider now the variant of the BAM whereby that awards
the contract to the supplier whose bid is closest to the average,
but below the average. Again, the cartel selects bidder 1 to win
by submitting €999. The remaining N–1 bidders bid the reserve
price. What is the amount a deviating bidder should submit in
order to win the contract? How much does the deviation cost to
him? Notice first that bidder 1 is indeed the winner since €999
is the only bid below the average, where the latter is equal to
(1/N)€999 +[(N–1)/N]€1000. To win the competitive procurement
a defecting bidder, say bidder 2, needs to place a bid such that
all other bids remain above the average. It is easy to see that €998
is not low enough as under linear and lowest-bid scoring. To see
this more clearly, consider the situation where N=5. Should bidder
2 submit €998 the average would be (998+999+3(1000))/5= 999.4.
With such an average, bidder 1 is still the winner. As a result,
€998 is not sufficient for bidder 2 to win the competitive
procurement. In order to be the winner, bidder 2 needs to bring
the average below €999. Then he needs to bid a price bdef such
that (bdef+999+3(1000))/5 ≤ 999, which implies bdef ≤ €996. More
generally, when the number of colluding firms is N, then bdef ≤
(N–1)€999 – (N–2)€1000.
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11 We assume in this example that prices have to be formulated as multiples
of 1€.
The most interesting remark, though, is that the equilibrium
outcome, i.e. the winning firm and offer, becomes very sensitive
to the distribution of costs among the bidders. This is of course
problematic since costs are typically unknown to the procurement
agency, which will then face high uncertainty and instability.
In fact, two competitive scenarios with slightly different
distributions of costs may lead to extremely different outcomes.
In particular, if the most efficient firm can supply at much lower
costs than its competitors, it will win by offering an even lower
bid than in the case of low-bid competitive tendering. If it cannot
afford such a low bid, firms are induced to bid in a “strange”
(and sometimes unpredictable) way. More precisely, in this case
firms’ optimal strategy would involve some randomization.
Rather than a single offer, each firm would submit a probability
distribution over a number of offers, i.e. firms will submit the
offer p1i with probability q
1
i < 1, the offer p
2
i with probability q
2
i <
1, and so on.
We can see this argument in more details, considering again
the environment described in Section 4.1. First, suppose that firm
1 has strong efficiency advantages with respect to the competitors.
That is, let for now 
c1<2c2 – c3
In this case, an equilibrium requires firm 1 to win by
submitting an offer p1 =2c2 – c3. In fact, suppose p2=c2 and p3 =c3.
The average bid is c2 and firm 1 wins, while firm 2 and 3 cannot
lower their bids any further.12 In this case, the method is able to
award the most efficient firm, but it is exacerbating, rather than
limiting, price competition. In fact, firm 1 is bidding below the price
needed to win a low-bid competitive tendering (2c2 – c3 < c2).
Suppose instead c1 > 2c2 – c3. The previous strategies are no
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12 Since firms 2 and 3 are getting zero profit, they could deviate at no cost;
hence, the equilibrium is not robust. Suppose for example firm 3 submits p3 = r.
Now our condition becomes stricter: firm 1 will have to bid 2c2 – r in order to
win. Firm 3 bid is part of the equilibrium if its offer will always be above the
average, even if it bids its production cost. 
longer feasible, since firm 1 will not bid below its marginal cost.
Instead, we argue that a strategy profile in which all firms submit
a single offer with probability one cannot be part of an
equilibrium. We can easily show this by contradiction. Suppose
that firms submit (p1, p2, p3) with probability one. Without loss of
generality, consider the following strategy profile
c1 < p1 < p2 < p3 < r.
Two relevant scenarios may arise. If p2 < a, firm 2 is the
winner, so firm 1 has an incentive to profitably deviate by bidding
marginally higher than p2. Firms will start increasing their bids,
but we know that p1 = p2= p3 = r cannot be an equilibrium since
all firm will then have an incentive to undercut their competitors.
If instead p2 > a, firm 1 is the winner, so firm 2 has an incentive
to profitably deviate by reducing its bid to a level marginally
higher than p1. Firms will decrease their bids up to their marginal
costs, where, given that c1 > 2c2 – c3, the average bid exceeds p2 =
c2, and we are back to the previous scenario.
13 Hence, there exists
no equilibrium such that the three firms submit a single offer with
certainty.
We can draw two main conclusions. First, this particular
variant destroys firms’ incentive to coordinate on a focal point
generated by other BAMs, so the tendering procedure may have
a pro-competitive effect. Nonetheless, it cannot be considered fully
competitive, since collusive agreements are easier to sustain than
in the case of a low-bid rule. Second, the equilibrium behaviour
either requires the most efficient firm to submit a very low bid
(hence intensifying rather than softening price competition) or it
involves randomization (hence producing an unpredictable
outcome from the procurement agency’s viewpoint as well). In
essence, similar competitive scenarios may generate very different
awarding prices.
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13 Note that the same argument applies to the cases where either p1=p2<p3 or
p1<p2=p3.
5. - In Further Research of a Rationale: BAMs and Costly
Participation 
The discussion so far has assumed that each firm, even when
expecting to make zero profit, was submitting a bid. Moreover, all
offers were important for the description of the equilibrium, since
in BAMs the winning bid depends on all other submitted bids. We
can now relax this assumption, leaving each firm the possibility to
decide whether or not to participate in the competitive tendering.
To make the discussion interesting, we consider the case where
participation is costly. When submitting a bid, each firm has to
pay some ε>0, which can be thought as an entry fee or, more
generally, as the cost to be spent in order to acquire information
about the auction and to decide the bidding strategy in a sensible
way. Given this ε, it is clear that no firm will participate if it expects
zero profit in equilibrium, i.e. if it will have to bid at its marginal
cost or if it has zero probability of getting the prize. This simple
observation changes somewhat the results in the previous sections,
as we now describe in more details.
Consider first the method where the winner is simply the
bidder closest to the average. As discussed in Section 4.1 firms
will submit the same offer, somewhere between the highest
production cost and the reserve price. These are still equilibria in
a game with costly participation, if ε is low enough, but we now
have an even larger set of possible outcomes. In fact, suppose
there are n potential competitors, ordered in term of efficiency:
r > cn > cn–1 > ... > c2 > c1
One can show that there exists an equilibrium where only the
first k most efficient firms enter and bid ck+1. For example, one
can have that firm 1, 2 and 3 enter and bid c4. Given this, no
other firm is willing to enter, since in order to win, it will have
to bid c4, which never exceeds its production cost. The average
bid will then be c4 and, for the same reason explained in Section
4.1, no participating firm has incentive to deviate. Whether this
more efficient equilibrium or some other will actually take place
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is something one cannot say a priori. This depends on how firms
manage to coordinate, which incentives they have to do so, hence
in particular on the distribution of production costs and
reservation price.14
Notice however that in any equilibrium at least three firms
will submit a bid.15 Hence, BAMs generally increase participation,
by giving some chance of winning also to the less efficient firms.
Moreover, having a large number of competing firms now is not
good news for the procurement agency: the higher the
participation the higher will be equilibrium prices, i.e. the further
we will move from the most efficient outcome. 
Despite affecting participation and the set of possible outcomes,
costly entry does not change the essential feature described above:
simple average method pushes towards homogeneity of bids,
thereby strongly limiting (or destroying) the ability to screen and
opening up to the possibility to extremely costly collusive
behaviours.
Now consider the variants of BAMs used in Italy. In this case,
a small entry cost makes a great difference, revealing once again
the instability of this method. In fact, the “strange” outcomes
described in Section 4.3 disappear: irrespective of the strength of
its efficiency advantage, firm 1 will win the auction by bidding
(slightly below) c2. Given firms’ incentives to bid slightly below
the average, bids will keep decreasing and the most inefficient
firms will then prefer not to participate (and not waste the ε). In
equilibrium, only firm 1 will bid and will make an offer exactly
sufficient to keep all the other firms, and in particular firm 2, out
of the competition. Hence, we get the very same outcome of a
low-bid competitive tendering. At this point, it is not clear why
one should use a method producing the same outcome as the most
standard tendering format. After all, awarding rules should aim
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14 These determine for example whether firms 1,2,3 prefer getting 1/3 of a
smaller prize (c4) rather than increasing the prize (up to r) but then having to
share it with a larger pool of participants.
15 If only firm 1 and 2 are participating, they both have the incentive to increase
their bid. This would not change their chance of winning (1/2) but it would increase
the size of the prize. By bidding higher than c3, however, they will attract firm 3
into the competition.
at simplicity, which is a way to improve transparency and reduce
costly litigations; hence, this variant of BAMs cannot be defended
because of equivalence with low-bids methods.
6. - Conclusion
We have reviewed the increasingly popular Bid Average
Methods and their strategic implications, which have proven often
in contradiction with what claimed by their advocates. The major
reason behind the adoption of BAMs is that they are supposed to
soften price competition, push competing firms to coordinate on a
“true and reasonable” bidding price, and hence reduce ex-post
transaction costs linked to delay and wasteful renegotiations
following cost overrun. We have argued that there are no theoretical
arguments to support these claims. If anything, standard economic
analysis would instead predict that firms will coordinate to bid on
the highest admissible price. We have also shown that a variant of
BAMs, where the winner is the one closest and below the average,
may be very sensitive to the specific features of the strategic
environment (distribution of production costs, participation costs...)
hence generally quite unpredictable from the procurement agency
viewpoint. At best, its outcome can be replicated by a simple low-
bid tendering format.
More generally, the awarding price affects ex-post cost overrun
and renegotiation problems only if they are linked to innocent
mistakes and exogenous shocks, and not at all when these
originate from opportunistic behaviour of suppliers. In any case,
these are better handled through cost-plus-contracts, surety bonds,
or alternative awarding methods described in Section 3. 
A possible line of defence of BAMs may still be that there
are situations where none of the proposed alternatives is viable.
For example, given public procurement regulation to enhance
accountability and prevent corruption, one may need to insure
against “excessive” price competition while not being able to:
identify the most suitable contractor and privately negotiate with
it; rely on any surety firm; evaluate discretionally the qualitative
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aspects of the offer... Hence, in a sense, despite giving up most of
the benefits of competition (and in particular failing to select the
most efficient firm and pay the lowest price) BAMs would represent
a “compromise” between a number of conflicting requirements and
constraints. It is clear however that, even accepting this line of
reasoning, one cannot advocate any general role for these methods,
being they dependent on a particular situation, where many
conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously. 
In conclusion, our analysis has not revealed any convincing
and general way to rationalize the fundamental tension inherent
to BAMs, which soften price competition while at the same time
using a competitive awarding rule. For these reasons, BMAs
remain largely a puzzle, which calls for further attention by
scholars and scrutiny by practitioners.
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